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IEEE Standard Criteria for Accident Monitoring Instrumentation for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, 2016
- IEEE Std 497-2016 Front cover
- Title page
- Important notices and disclaimers concerning IEEE standards documents
- Participants
- Introduction
- Contents
- Important notice
- 1. Overview [Go to Page]
- 1.1 Scope
- 1.2 Purpose
- 1.3 Application
- 2. Normative references [Go to Page]
- 2.1 Normative references for IEEE domain
- 2.2 Normative references for IEC domain
- 3. Definitions
- 4. Selection criteria [Go to Page]
- 4.1 Type A variables
- 4.2 Type B variables
- 4.3 Type C variables
- 4.4 Type D variables
- 4.5 Type E variables
- 4.6 Type F variables
- 4.7 Documentation of selection criteria
- 5. Performance criteria [Go to Page]
- 5.1 Range
- 5.2 Accuracy
- 5.3 Response time
- 5.4 Required operating time
- 5.5 Reliability
- 5.6 Documentation of performance criteria
- 6. Design criteria [Go to Page]
- 6.1 Single failure
- 6.2 Common cause failure
- 6.3 Independence and physical separation
- 6.4 Isolation
- 6.5 Information ambiguity
- 6.6 Power supply
- 6.7 Calibration
- 6.8 Testability
- 6.9 Direct measurement
- 6.10 Control of access
- 6.11 Maintenance and repair
- 6.12 Minimizing measurements
- 6.13 Auxiliary supporting features
- 6.14 Portable instruments
- 6.15 Documentation of design criteria
- 7. Qualification criteria [Go to Page]
- 7.1 Type A variables
- 7.2 Type B variables
- 7.3 Type C variables
- 7.4 Type D variables
- 7.5 Type E variables
- 7.6 Type F variables
- 7.7 Portable instruments
- 7.8 Operating time
- 7.9 Documentation of qualification criteria
- 8. Display criteria [Go to Page]
- 8.1 Display characteristics
- 8.2 Trend or rate information
- 8.3 Display identification
- 8.4 Type of monitoring channel display
- 8.5 Display location
- 8.6 Information ambiguity
- 8.7 Recording
- 8.8 Digital display signal validation
- 8.9 Documentation of display criteria
- 9. Quality assurance
- Annex A (informative) Accident monitoring instrument channel accuracy [Go to Page]
- A.1 Introduction
- A.2 Accuracy requirement groupings according to usage
- A.3 Typical accuracy requirements
- Annex B (informative) Examples of monitoring channel displays
- Annex C (informative) Operational state diagram
- Annex D (informative) Bibliography
- Back cover
- 497-2016 Participants.pdf [Go to Page]
- 1. Overview [Go to Page]
- 1.1 Scope
- 1.2 Purpose
- 1.3 Application
- 2. Normative references [Go to Page]
- 2.1 Normative references for IEEE domain
- 2.2 Normative references for IEC domain
- 3. Definitions
- 4. Selection criteria [Go to Page]
- 4.1 Type A variables
- a) Take specific planned manually-controlled actions for which no automatic control is provided and that are required for safety systems to perform their safety functions as assumed in the plant accident analysis licensing basis.
- b) Take specific planned manually-controlled actions for which no automatic control is provided and that are required to mitigate the consequences of an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) as assumed in the plant accident analysis licensing basis. [Go to Page]
- 4.2 Type B variables
- 4.3 Type C variables
- 4.4 Type D variables
- a) Indicate the performance of those safety systems and auxiliary supporting features necessary for the mitigation of DBEs.
- b) Indicate the performance of other systems and auxiliary supporting features necessary to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition.
- c) Verify safety system status. [Go to Page]
- 4.5 Type E variables
- a) Monitoring the magnitude of releases of radioactive materials through identified pathways (e.g., secondary safety valves and condenser air ejector).
- b) Monitoring the environmental conditions used to determine the impact of releases of radioactive materials through identified pathways (e.g., wind speed, wind direction, and air temperatures).
- c) Monitoring radiation levels and radioactivity in the plant environs.
- d) Monitoring radiation levels and radioactivity in the control room and selected plant areas where access may be required for plant recovery. [Go to Page]
- 4.6 Type F variables
- 4.7 Documentation of selection criteria
- 5. Performance criteria [Go to Page]
- 5.1 Range
- 5.2 Accuracy
- 5.3 Response time
- 5.4 Required operating time
- a) The required operating time for Type A variable instrument channels shall be the duration for which the measured variable is required by the plant’s LBD.
- b) The required operating time for Type B variable instrument channels shall be at least the duration associated with the longest-duration design basis event for that variable.
- c) The required operating time for Type C variable instrument channels shall be the duration for which the measured variable is required by the plant’s LBD or at least 100 days.
- d) The required operating time for Type D variable instrument channels shall be the duration for which the measured variable is required by the plant’s LBD.
- e) The required operating time for Type E variable instrument channels shall be the duration for which the measured variable is required by the plant’s LBD.
- f) The required operating time for Type F variable instrument channels shall be sufficient to implement mitigation guidance based on the longest duration analyzed severe accident event in addition to any design basis event that may precede it. [Go to Page]
- 5.5 Reliability
- 5.6 Documentation of performance criteria
- a) Allowances for calibration uncertainties, loop errors, and drift (consistent with the methodology given in ANSI/ISA Std 67.04.01-2006 [B2]).
- b) The magnitude and direction of errors imposed on the accident monitoring instrumentation by environmental and/or seismic conditions during and after the postulated event.
- 6. Design criteria [Go to Page]
- 6.1 Single failure
- a) Any single detectable failure within the accident monitoring instrumentation concurrent with identifiable but non-detectable failures.
- b) Failures occurring as a result of the single failure.
- c) Failures and spurious system actions that cause or are caused by the accident requiring the accident monitoring function. [Go to Page]
- 6.2 Common cause failure
- 6.3 Independence and physical separation
- a) Instrumentation shall be physically separated from non-safety system equipment and circuits so that a failure in, or spurious action by, non-safety system equipment and circuits shall not prevent the accident monitoring equipment from meeting the r...
- b) Redundant segments shall be independent of, and physically separated from, each other to the degree necessary to retain the capability of accomplishing the accident monitoring function during and following any design basis event requiring that func...
- c) Accident monitoring equipment required to monitor a specific design basis event should be independent of, and physically separated from, the effects of the design basis event in order to retain the capability to meet the requirements of this standard.
- d) Independence and physical separation shall meet the requirements of IEEE Std 384-2008/IEC 60709:2004. [Go to Page]
- 6.4 Isolation
- 6.5 Information ambiguity
- a) Having the capabilities of being able to perturb the measured variable and determine which channel has failed by observing the instrument channel.
- b) Cross checking the value with an independent channel that monitors a different variable that bears a known relationship to the instrument channel.
- c) Providing an additional independent channel of instrumentation. [Go to Page]
- 6.6 Power supply
- 6.7 Calibration
- 6.8 Testability
- a) By observing the effect of perturbing the monitored variable
- b) By observing the effect of introducing and varying, as appropriate, a substitute input to the sensor of the same nature as the measured variable
- c) By cross checking between channels that bear a known relationship to each other
- d) By automatic on-line diagnostics of channel availability [Go to Page]
- 6.9 Direct measurement
- 6.10 Control of access
- 6.11 Maintenance and repair
- 6.12 Minimizing measurements
- 6.13 Auxiliary supporting features
- 6.14 Portable instruments
- 6.15 Documentation of design criteria
- 7. Qualification criteria [Go to Page]
- 7.1 Type A variables
- 7.2 Type B variables
- 7.3 Type C variables
- 7.4 Type D variables
- 7.5 Type E variables
- 7.6 Type F variables
- 7.7 Portable instruments
- 7.8 Operating time
- 7.9 Documentation of qualification criteria
- 8. Display criteria [Go to Page]
- 8.1 Display characteristics [Go to Page]
- 8.1.1 Information characteristics
- 8.1.2 Human factors
- 8.1.3 Anomalous indications
- 8.1.4 Continuous vs. on-demand display
- 8.2 Trend or rate information
- 8.3 Display identification
- 8.4 Type of monitoring channel display
- 8.5 Display location
- 8.6 Information ambiguity
- 8.7 Recording
- 8.8 Digital display signal validation
- 8.9 Documentation of display criteria
- 9. Quality assurance
- Annex A (informative) Accident monitoring instrument channel accuracy [Go to Page]
- A.1 Introduction
- A.2 Accuracy requirement groupings according to usage
- A.3 Typical accuracy requirements
- Annex B (informative) Examples of monitoring channel displays
- Annex C (informative) Operational state diagram
- Annex D (informative) Bibliography [Go to Page]